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The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") (or Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")) 2 has presented the
doormen to the courthouse doors in the United States, responsible for checking the plain-
tiffs and defendants against the acceptable guest list, with ever-increasing problems-and
once the litigants are inside, the judicial hosts seriously struggle deciding whether to enter-
tain the claims and defenses brought to the party.3 In Professor Doug Branson's article,
1. This Symposium was held in March 2010 and this Response was completed, except for minor style
edits, at the end of July, 2010, prior to the September 17, 2010 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010), petition for reh'g denied, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS2200
(2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011), petition for cert filed, No. 10-1491 (U.S. June 6, 2011). The publication process
did not permit time to change this Response to reflect this and other subsequent developments. Al-
though significant, the Kiobel decision has certainly not finally decided the issues of ATS corporate
liability or the role of the ATS in corporate social responsibility, and the reflections contained herein
have continuing relevance in what is still a live debate even in a post-Kiobel world.
* Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1998; B.A.
Western Michigan University, 1995. I thank the editors of the Santa Clara journal of International Law
for hosting and inviting me to participate in this 2010 Symposium on Corporations and International
Law. This paper was presented as a response to the remarks of Professor Doug Branson at that sym-
posium.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article Ill, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
587 (2002) (explaining distinction between "Alien Tort Statute" as opposed to "Alien Tort Claims Act"
to refer to section 1350).
3. Many of the thoughts herein are presented for the first time, although some have predicates in earlier
work. As space provided for this response has been limited, the curious reader can find my more
comprehensive analyses of ATS litigation elsewhere. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Boyakasha, Fist to Fist:
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Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles' Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Lit-
igation,4 we are exposed to a new chapter in the doormen's dilemma in the ATS litigation
saga and the development of international law.
Professor Branson's primary point of discussion involves the increasing struggle by the
courts over whether to increase the scope of entities responsible under the ATS. 5 This re-
sponse argues that as ATS jurisprudence matures or becomes more sophisticated,6 the legi-
timate limits of the law regress.
The primary areas discussed in Branson's article are the developments in corporate ATS
liability related to direct action or aiding and abetting theories, and the possibility of reach-
ing up the tiers in a corporate hierarchy based on theories of veil piercing, enterprise liabil-
ity, joint venture, and agency.7 Most of his article deals with what I will call the "entity lia-
bility" issue resulting from the complex form of multinational corporations:
[M]ost multinationals are great-great grandparent corporations, or great grandparents, of the entity
(subsidiary) doing business and committing the acts of which the plaintiffs complain. Interleaved be-
tween the great grandchild corporation and the household name multinational may be two or three
layers of subsidiaries, corporations which we might term a parent, a grandparent, and a great
grandparent.8
Branson's article does a great service in analyzing this interesting and unsettled ques-
tion of which entities can be sued and held liable under the ATS. The developments have
broad implications for the future development of corporate law, as well as for the meaning
of international law itself.
II. The Role of the ATS
The ATS grants the federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over cases in which an
alien sues for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations.9 It has become the prin-
Respect and the Philosophical Link with Reciprocity in International Law and Human Rights, 38
GEOWASH. INT'L L. REV. 349 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the
Scope of the "Law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153 (1998); Donald 1.
Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role
of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 103
(2005); Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary International Law: The
Role of NGOs and United States Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 240 (2004); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereign-
ty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domesticjudicial
Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 507 (2006).
4. Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles' Heels in Alien Tort
Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 227 (2011).
5. Id.
6. Branson recognizes that lawyers must be on the ready in ATS litigation, as the introduction of multi-
national corporations to the field of litigation presents a whole new game. See, e.g., id. at 249 ("The
number of ancillary issues which are likely to arise, and may be dispositive of a given [ATS] case, has
grown exponentially since multinational corporations, and the large resourceful law firms likely to
represent them, have arrived on the scene.").
7. Id. at 237-48.
8. Id. at 228. See also Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globali-
zation, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 705, 769 (2002) (discussing parent/subsidiary problems in ATS litiga-
tion).
9. The ATS provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2006).
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cipal mechanism in U.S. courts for attempting to hold nation-states, state actors, and even
private individuals or corporations responsible for what are alleged to be actual, complicit,
aided or abetted, or conspiratorial violations of international law. Scores of ATS lawsuits
against private actors-principally corporations-have been filed in the last fifteen years.10
As a Financial Times columnist stated: "U.S. plaintiffs' lawyers have... made it their chief
weapon in a twenty-first century battle over corporate responsibility in an age of globalisa-
tion."11
While once very sparse and unique, one writer claimed in a June 2009 article that
"[tihese lawsuits have become so routine... they've barely caused a ripple in the news
cycle."1 2 The frequency of lawsuits remains on the rise and the jurisprudential complexities
compound with each new case.13
The early ATS cases were relatively easy and sympathetic-targeting ruthless regimes
and atrocious governmental actors. 14 With easy facts and often default judgments,
precedent under the ATS began to build. But as with many evolutionary trends on legal
doctrines, early expansion bred further expansion, and ultimately the cases became more
complicated.
That is the state of the ATS today, working through growing pains associated with cor-
porations as defendants. And, the further expansion within the corporate defendant pool-
attempting to pin liability on parent, grandparent, or great grandparent corporations and
up to the top-raises the stakes and complexity of ATS litigation. Prospects of recovery un-
der these ATS cases, according to Branson, are seen as a "bonanza" for human rights law-
yers and environmental activists.s
III. The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate
It is important to explore how the trend Branson examines relates to the overall cor-
porate social responsibility debate. That debate exists at and between two extremes. 16 One
10. See Branson, supra note 4, at 228 & n.5 (listing corporate ATS defendants); see, e.g., MICHAEL KOEBELE,
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE (2009).
11. Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at 12.
12. Steven Dudley, Lawsuits Against Multinationals for Abuses Abroad May Be Losing Steam, MIAMI HERALD,
June 15, 2009, at G12; see also Lee G. Dunst, Courts Have Enforced Strict Gatekeeping Function in Dis-
missing Suits Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2009, at S6 (stating that ATS suits are
"now commonplace for companies with international operations").
13. Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts From Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2009, at
All ("Victims of human-rights abuses around the world increasingly are seeking justice American
style-by filing lawsuits against deep-pocketed defendants .... Both sides agree on one thing: Courts
increasingly are willing to consider alien-tort suits and to force companies to answer for their beha-
vior overseas.").
14. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving allegations of kidnapping, tor-
turing, and killing by police officials in Paraguay); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (involving allegations of various
atrocities including rape, torture, and summary executions by the Bosnian-Serb military forces).
15. Branson, supra note 4, at 228.
16. "Corporate social responsibility" is difficult to define. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Respon-
sibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2006). It means different things
to different people and it has been the subject of extensive debate for centuries. Id. ("The debate over
corporate social responsibility is often vague or unrealistic or both. The participants speak in terms of
how corporations ought to be run, without specifying the legal changes that will produce these re-
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views the concept of corporate social responsibility as essentially nonexistent, unless it
happens to be an accidental and spontaneous outcome of otherwise self-interested finan-
cial motives of a profit-maximizing corporation.1 7 The other believes that corporations
should become governmental surrogates, conscripted philanthropists, or otherwise con-
strained with affirmative perceived-moral obligations that can be compelled by coercive
force. For purposes of this discussion, I will characterize this extreme as the "expansionist"
view.
The spectrum between these extremes1 8 resembles the classic debate over the negative
and positive rights of man as they relate to obligation and the justification for intervention
by institutions of power. The corporate social responsibility discussion raises three prin-
cipal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how a corporation chooses its self-
interest versus the interests of others, when and how it should help others if control deci-
sions may harm the shareholder owners, and how far the corporation must affirmatively
go to help right the perceived wrongs in the world in which it operates.19 Although these
questions could be posed simply as ones of policy or morality, with the injection of the ATS
into the discussion they become questions that must be answered by examining the dic-
tates and limits of law. 20
"Corporate social responsibility" is a term that sounds difficult to quibble with as a goal.
It exudes a sense of "the good" or "the proper." The marketing of law or ideas is advanced
by the terms used to define the goals of expanded limitations on corporate behavior: rights,
responsibilities, duties, human rights, morality, ethics, virtue, equality, accountability, and
the like. It is against the backdrop of stories of genocide, killings, abuse, oppression, des-
pair, poverty, inequality, slavery, starvation, arms, unjust imprisonment, apartheid, the Ho-
locaust, greed, selfishness, and the like. It is easy to "sell" the ideas and projects that seek to
solve or remedy these problems.
The optics favor the expansionist view. Friedman described it as the "already too preva-
lent view that the pursuit of profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed and con-
trolled by external forces."21
When juxtaposed against these themes, the motives and actions of the big corporation
sound just plain bad. The competing terms like profit, wealth, or economic development
seem dirty, unclean, or at best sterile. They evoke passions only in their opposition, not in
suits.").
17. The primary proponent of this "profit-maximizing view" is Milton Friedman. See MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). See also Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32 [hereinafter NY Times article].
18. Williams, supra note 8, at 711-24 (providing a good summary of the corporate social responsibility
literature and the positions along the spectrum).
19. Writing generally on the obligations of man and his relation to the state, Fried's introduction to his
exposition in Right and Wrong provides an apt set of analogous questions: "This is a book about how a
moral man lives his life: how he approaches choices between his own interests and those of others,
what he should do if helping one person means hurting another, how far he must take on himself the
burdens of the world's suffering." CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 1 (1978).
20. Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Consent Concept of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility, 38 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 635, 635-36 (2004) ("[T]he career of the ATCA cases...
reflects and in turn shapes the contours of a broader struggle: .. .one that deals with the very mean-
ing and scope of the notion of corporate social responsibility....").
21. NY Times article, supra note 17, at 32.
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their promotion. Expansion-inclined corporate social responsibility advocates rely on
painting corporations as different-as the anti-good, too wealthy, and too large. The argu-
ment that a profit maximization model of corporate governance advances the broad societ-
al goals even better than the expansionist view falls on deaf ears. 22 It is often ignored that
the profit maximization theory is conditioned on companies operating within legal con-
straints. 23 And, even when recognized, the obvious retort is that existing conditions mean
we must need more law.
IV. A Category-Based Framework for the Mechanization of Corporate
Social Responsibility Objectives
Ultimately, implementing the corporate social responsibility movement's objective re-
quires that we determine the ends or objectives of the enterprise-requiring that we un-
derstand the meaning of "responsibility"-and then ascertain the means for achieving such
ends. 24 Does the mandate for corporate social responsibility set aspirational goals, provide
metrics for evaluation, and fill information gaps, thereby encouraging or incentivizing be-
havioral change? Or, does it necessitate we require changes in behavior and provide insti-
tutional enforcement mechanisms with the imprimatur of some lawmaking body with
coercive power?
Whatever the measure or the meaning of corporate social responsibility, the mechan-
isms for accomplishing corporate social responsibility can be loosely grouped into three
broad categories:
A. Internally-Induced, Profit-Driven/Voluntary
This first category encompasses all corporate social responsibility measures that are
generated purely out of an individual corporation's financial self-interest and the tradi-
tionally recognized role of the corporation to be managed to maximize shareholder wealth.
There are no external pressures other than those traditional incidents of business affecting
profit that motivate corporate behavior, yet nonetheless the corporation's profit maximiz-
ing motive may coincide with outcomes that can be defined as socially desirable. The
change in behavior grows organically from a business model that seeks to maximize profits
within the constraints of the law.
22. For more on this argument, see ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 397, 399 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776); see also Ian Narveson, The "Invisible Hand," 46 J.
Bus. ETHICS 201 (2003).
23. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2 (1986) ("[T]he profit-maximizing norm does not imply
that corporations and their managers have only minimal legal obligations to persons other than
shareholders. Quite the contrary is true.").
24. Ribstein, supra note 16, at 1432-33.
[T]he legal issue is not whether the corporation or any of the individuals who manage it should care
about society .... The question addressed here is whether the law should mandate such governance,
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B. Non-Coercive, Pressure-Induced/Quasi- Voluntary
This category includes actions that can be labeled as achieving socially responsible cor-
porate action outside of profit-based decisions to meet consumer demands or other results
from purely self-interested profit-maximizing motives. It involves actions that are induced
from external pressures short of coercive force. Actions that fall into this category are
those not initiated out of a unilateral desire but instead out of necessity-situations where
inaction or non-responsiveness would intrude on profits. Actions here are not about max-
imizing shareholder value but instead more appropriately characterized as about minimiz-
ing shareholder harm.
Efforts dedicated to the protection and maintenance of the brand or reputation in order
not to lose customers, rather than enhancement of the brand or reputation in order to gain
customers, fall within this category. 2s Responses to public campaigns, boycotts, shaming
techniques, shakedowns, and other pressure tactics from individuals or interest groups
that require financial outlays but provide no net financial gain also fall into this category. 26
In this category, appeasement and silencing of opposition motivates corporate behavior.
Promises can be extracted in consideration for cessation of campaigns against corporation
or agreements not to sue. Thus, the threat of litigation may be the type of pressure im-
posed, resulting in an alteration in corporate behavior as a result of pre-litigation or pre-
filing settlements of differences.
The currency by which a corporation may satisfy the pressure imposed against it could
involve alterations in behavior, expenditures on public relations campaigns, or contribu-
tions to funds or charities of allegedly affected groups. It could take the form of outright
monetary payments, ceasing or altering operations to comply with demands or private
codes or protocols, enacting codes of conduct, joining compacts, establishing corporate so-
cial responsibility departments, instituting training, committing to transparency initiatives
like contracting for external audits, and other mechanisms that either alter behavior or
otherwise satisfy those interests applying some form of pressure to the corporate opera-
tion.
C. Coercion-Induced/Involuntary
The final category includes actions that advance corporate social responsibility not as a
matter of choice but instead due to an enforceable legal obligation. This category includes
true legal enforcement mechanisms, involving the creation of jurisdiction, enforceable
rights, duties, causes of action, and remedies, along with the creation or recognition of in-
stitutions given the authority and coercive power to enforce the social responsibility dic-
tates. Obviously, the corporate ATS lawsuit falls in this category.
Within this category, corporate behaviors must change to comply with law and to avoid
the imposition of liability or penalties when laws govern their behavior. If they deviate
25. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 41, 47 (2010) ("[A] company's reputation has become one of its most valuable assets.").
26. Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to Avoid Alien Tort Claims Act
Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better Business Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 55 (2009)
(discussing harm to reputation and corporate responses).
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from legal standards, corporations may be subject to civil liability, fines, criminal penalties
or other coercive measures. The expansionist objectives get teeth through enforceability
and move beyond mere hopes of change.
Proactive corporations will adjust their behavior at the fear of the imposed penalties or
liability from these coercive measures or even at the mere initiation of litigation, as each
can tarnish their reputations. 27 After an ATS suit is filed much of the damage is done, so
preventative intervention is important.2 8 The mere threat or risk of liability can induce set-
tlement or litigants can extract promises of category two actions in exchange for dismiss-
ing a case.29 Finally, to the extent that lawsuits create settled law, precedent brings the
stamp of legitimacy and provides valuable leverage for expansionists in future campaigns.
V. Legal Mechanization Merges Expansionist Views with Accepted
Constraints of the Profit-Maximizing View
The law can provide the strongest stamp of acceptance behind a social responsibility
norm or objective.30 The closer those advocating expansive corporate social responsibility
can equate their calls for corporate behavioral change to legal obligations, the more they
can cut away at the objections from those espousing a "profit maximization within the
law"-only constraint on corporate decision making. First, settled legal rules can govern
corporate conduct rather than mere goals. Second, if the enforceable law takes an expan-
sionist view, then the strict view is forced to incorporate it through the accepted constraint
on profit-maximization: Compliance with the law. The distinction between the profit max-
imization view and the expansionist view collapses.
VI. Impacts of the ATS on Corporate Conduct
The ATS is arguably the most important tool under the coercion-induced/involuntary
category. It provides a means for reaching states, individuals, and corporations, and hold-
ing them to legally enforceable standards. 31 Thus, how the ATS develops is pivotal to the
most powerful mechanization opportunity for corporate social responsibility ideals. 32
Branson states in closing that, "[tihe ultimate objective should be to send a message to
corporate boardrooms and to obtain a recovery for persons who have suffered very real
harms" in the form of using lawsuits to extract promises and induce changes in behavior.33
As a result, he claims, "ATS suits thus have already served one of the highest and best pur-
27. ATS litigation avoidance encourages companies to change behavior. Id. at 74-75.
28. Id. at 59 ("Even though cases regarding human rights violations often result in settlement or dismis-
sal, the tarnish to a corporation's reputation remains.").
29. Williams, supra note 8, at 772 ("[T]hese cases may be important almost irrespective of their outcome,
because they represent a form of leverage and a forum for leverage being newly brought to bear
30. Id. at 724 ("[W]ell-designed laws, organizational designs, and liability and enforcement structures are
the necessary theoretical precondition for the predominant view to be correct.").
31. Shamir, supra note 20, at 637 ("ATCA cases [are] one element in a wide spectrum of attempts to tame
corporate behavior by inventing new global regulatory regimes.").
32. Williams, supra note 8, at 724-66 (discussing problems and possibilities of using the ATS).
33. Branson, supra note 4, at 249.
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poses they possibly could have."34 That should not be the purpose of law.
We should not praise the ATS as a success for accomplishing settlements by manipulat-
ing the law in a manner that opens the courthouse doors simply to provide leverage to bul-
ly corporations into social reform. But setting aside whether settlement "should" be an "ul-
timate objective" of ATS suits, Branson is correct to note that settlement is a primary
objective of many litigants.
Early ATS plaintiffs were faced with incomplete and unsatisfactory victories against na-
tion states or foreign leaders, the principal tortfeasors.3 S Sovereign immunity, personal ju-
risdiction, political question doctrine, act of state doctrine, and other prudential rules make
many nations or governmental actors difficult to sue in United States courts, even with the
existence of the ATS. Moreover, some state actors proved to be judgment-proof or other-
wise sufficiently insulated from collection on judgments, making victories against them
somewhat hollow, at least economically so. 36 Corporations do not pose as many problems.
And, the quest to expand entity liability within the corporate ATS lawsuit is simply follow-
ing a well-known course in the evolution of tort theories-the search for the deepest pock-
ets.
The ATS-its threat of liability and brand-damaging effects-is a tool, a weapon, and an
instrument to wield against corporations to induce change and achieve social reform. The
current uncertainty in ATS law or existence of risk is a motivator for settlement or beha-
vior alteration,37 as are the extensive litigation costs, time consumed, and potential damage
to brand and reputation from protracted litigation. Settlement also avoids discovery in
many cases that may dredge up uncomfortable images that could damage the corporation
regardless of whether any culpability is established in court. As stated in a special report in
The Economist:
Most of the rhetoric on CSR may be about doing the right thing and trumping competitors, but much
of the reality is plain risk management. It involves limiting the damage to the brand and the bottom
line that can be inflicted by a bad press and consumer boycotts, as well as dealing with the threat of
legal action. In America, the legal instrument of choice ... is the Alien Tort Claims Act.3 8
Settlement value can be quite high, ranging from agreements to changed behaviors to
large payments like the recent $15 million settlement by Shell in 2009 to resolve ATS liti-
gation regarding its operations in Nigeria.39
The expansion beyond subsidiaries and toward parent and grandparent corporations as
34. Id.
35. Koppel, supra note 13, at All ("[C]orporations are being used unfairly as a surrogate for foreign gov-
ernments in these cases.").
36. Dellinger, supra note 26, at 91 ("[ATS] litigation has largely been unsuccessful in the sense that no
solid judgments against these corporations have been entered .... In the past, individuals have used
the ATS merely to obtain a sense of justice, realizing that the monetary award may never come.").
37. In a non-ATS context, the Supreme Court recognized that when there is "uncertainty of the governing
rules, entities subject to secondary liability as aiders and abettors may find it prudent and necessary,
as a business judgment to abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in order to avoid the
expense and risk of going to trial." Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 189 (1994).
38. A Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility. A Stitch in Time, EcONOMIST, Jan. 18, 2008, at 66.
See also Dudley, supra note 12, at G12 ("It seems to be about minimizing legal risks").
39. Dunst, supra note 12, at S6.
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liable entities is motivated by the fact that subsidiaries face some of the judgment infirmi-
ties faced by suits against state actors-their assets cannot be reached or are not large
enough to obtain the full recovery that plaintiffs believe that they are due. Branson ac-
knowledges the same when he says that "the goal is to reach the top," to reach a household
name and overcome the problems of subsidiaries (or even immediate parents) that are
corporations with few or no assets. 40
VII. Expanding Entity Liability in the Search to Cure Every Ill
The developments Branson highlights are demonstrative of the ethos of the expansion-
ist corporate social responsibility view that bad things happen in the world and someone
must pay. Not every wrong, even moral wrong, can be righted by the law.4 ' "While it may
seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the
realities of this world."42 Neither domestic nor international law is intended to provide a
legal remedy for every wrong, harm, injury, or unfortunate social condition. Arguments to
the contrary in the ATS cases and elsewhere, although pulling at the heartstrings, miscon-
strue legal doctrines.43
VIII. Increasing Entity Liability Threatens the Vitality of the Corporate
Form
The threat of corporate liability under the ATS should be taken seriously by corpora-
tions and the public at large. Large organizations, like corporations, "increase social wel-
fare, because without them certain large-scale business ventures would be impossible or
would be carried out in a wasteful way."44 Every increase in liability, and every expansion
of the definition of responsible parties for alleged wrongs, threatens to deter investment in
many of the countries where ATS wrongs allegedly occur.
Furthermore, the corporate form itself and the use of subsidiaries is a long recognized,
vital component to the proper and efficient functioning of the corporate system. This in-
cludes the separation of ownership, assets, control, and liabilities. The necessity of such
separation is even more acute for multinational corporations with entities operating in
geographically and geopolitically diverse markets and governance systems. 45
It bears repeating that in discussing the importance of a strict adherence to a presump-
tion against piercing the corporate veil, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in United States v.
Bestfoods the following fundamentals: "It is a general principle of corporate law deeply 'in-
40. Branson, supra note 4, at 229.
41. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) (explaining that courts will not fashion a remedy
without a right, and even then only when considering broader policy).
42. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619 (N.Y. 1969).
43. See Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113 (N.Y.1977) ("There can be no doubt that the plaintiffs have
suffered and the temptation is great to offer them some form of relief. Ideally, there should be a re-
medy for every wrong. This is not the function of the law...
44. CLARK, supra note 23, at 679-80.
45. It is worth noting that there is nothing particularly distinct about entity liability with multinational
corporations that calls for the application of different rules under the ATS than would traditionally be
applied to the assessment of liability between layers of a corporate family.
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grained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation (so-called because of
control through ownership of another corporation's stock) is not liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries."46 This "bedrock principle"47 applies unless a statute clearly rejects its opera-
tion. The ATS certainly does not do so.
Thus, we are left with the limitation that a parent may be held liable only if the wrongs
were the result of direct action by the parent or if the corporate form is misused to accom-
plish wrongs that are analogous to fraud, thereby allowing for a piercing of the corporate
veil. 48 That piercing exception is not intended to make the corporate parent liable generally
for all wrongs that may be attributable to separate actions of its subsidiary. To do other-
wise, as has been attempted in the cases Branson discusses, dismantles the separation of
ownership and control in the parent/subsidiary relationship.
IX. Let Us Not Lose Sight of the Cart
Branson's focus on the scope of corporate entity defendants as the leading emerging is-
sue in ATS litigation regarding corporations is instructive and valuable. In explaining this
focus, Branson says that arguments focusing on other pieces of the ATS controversy related
to the meaning and legitimacy of international law itself, "put the cart before the horse."49
As my final comment, I hope that we do not lose sight of that cart. Entity liability issues
should not deflect attention from additional concerns with the ATS regarding jurisdictional
issues, substantive legitimacy of the laws claimed to exist and apply, foreign policy con-
cerns, and the implications of increased liability for economic growth and development. To
do so would be to grant those vital debates, and others that linger, a premature death.
X. Conclusion
As the courts continue to address the entity liability issues Branson describes, the tradi-
tional limits of the law will be tested. Every expansion of liability, whether it is in terms of
the persons or entities who may be sued or the nature of claims recognized as creating le-
gal obligations, should be viewed cautiously. As a Washington Post editorial noted, "[y]ou
don't have to be indifferent to human rights abuses to have misgivings about" the expand-
ing reading of the ATS.50
46. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (citing William 0. Douglas & Carroll M. Shanks, Insu-
lation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929)). There is some merit to
Branson's claim that Bestfoods gives plaintiffs some hope in piercing the corporate veil, Branson, su-
pra note 4, at 242-43, but as a general matter, the Court reinforced a very strict presumption against
piercing.
47. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62.
48. Id.
49. Branson, supra note 4, at 230.
50. Editorial, Old Law, New Questions, WASH. PosT, July 20, 2004, at A16.
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